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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND ORDINANCES
REGULATING ADULT ESTABLISHMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Governmental units long have had the power to regulate the use of
land located within their borders.1 A dilemma arises, however, when
governmental land use regulations conflict with protected first amend-
ment rights.2 Municipal regulation of adult entertainment facilities3 is
an example of such a conflict. This Recent Development will examine
case law involving clashes between the first amendment4 and govern-
mental regulation of adult establishments.
II. GUIDANCE BY THE SUPREME COURT
Prior restraints on freedom of expression are discouraged by the
Constitution.' Any system of prior restraints is automatically suspect,
and there is a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
Although obscenity is not constitutionally-protected speech,' nonob-
I. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.1 (1982). In Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme Court first recognized a municipal-
ity's ability to regulate the use of land. Id. at 390-97.
Euclid created a presumption of validity for municipal land use regulations by ruling
that unless a court finds a zoning act arbitrary and unreasonable, the regulation should
not be overturned. Id. at 395.
2. The first amendment provides in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. See G. GUN-
THER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1106-17 (10th ed. 1980). Only protected expressions are
at issue. Activity determined to be "obscene" is not entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). An activity is not obscene,
however, merely because the topic of sex is involved. Id. at 487. See Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (first amendment protection applies to films involv-
ing nudity); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) (nude dancing); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (books).
3. For purposes of this article, the term "adult entertainment facilities" includes
adult movie theaters, adult bookstores and similar businesses established to titillate sex-
ual pleasure.
4. See supra note 2.
5. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
6. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
7. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). In Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973), the Supreme Court stated that, to decide whether an expression is obscene,
the trier of fact must determine:
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scene expressions, such as those commonly found in adult entertain-
ment establishments, are protected.8 Freedom of expression is not
absolute, however, and courts will not prohibit all prior restraints.9 As
a result, the extent to which a municipality may regulate protected ex-
pressions in adult establishments is not clear.
The Supreme Court first addressed the conflict between the first
amendment and adult establishment regulations in Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville. ° The Erznoznik court held unconstitutional an ordi-
nance that prohibited drive-in movie theaters from showing films con-
taining nudity if their screens were visible from a public street or
place." The Court's central concern was the ordinance's lack of con-
tent neutrality."1 The ordinance only prohibited exhibition of movies
containing nudity, ignoring films that contained other offensive mate-
rial. 3 The Court also found the scope of the ordinance improperly
overbroad.14 Because it prohibited harmless forms of nudity,15 the or-
dinance could not be justified by the city's interest protecting children.
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [cita-
tions omitted]; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Id. at 24.
8. Cohen v. California, 402 U.S. 15 (1971).
9. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961).
10. 422 U.S. 205 (1974).
11. Id. at 206-07.
12. Id. at 211. Under the rule of content neutrality a government may not regulate
the content of protected speech. Id. at 215. Restrictions on the time, place and manner
are permissible if upheld as reasonable and neutral as to the content of the speech re-
stricted. Police Dep't. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). See Note, Second Class
Speech: The Court's Refinement of Content Regulation, 61 NEB. L. REV. 361 (1982). If
the rule of content neutrality did not exist, "government officials [would] have the
power to suppress the publication of information they would rather conceal and of
points of view with which they disagree." Gerard, First Amendment Aspects of Control
of Outdoor Advertising, 145 RESEARCH REsuLTs DIG., NAT'L COOPERATIVE HIGH-
WAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, 3, 4 (July 1985).
13. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208. For example, acts of violence could be considered
just as offensive, or even more offensive, to a passerby than some forms of nudity. Id. at
214-15.
14. Id. at 212-15.
15. Id. at 212-14. Such harmless forms of nudity included a baby's buttocks, the
nude body of a war victim and scenes of a culture in which nudity is the norm. Id. at
213.
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Similarly, the ordinance was underinclusive with respect to the city's
interest in traffic safety, as almost any scene on the screen could dis-
tract a passing motorist. 16
A subsequent Supreme Court case, Young v. American Mini Thea-
ters, 7 involved the first amendment and regulation of adult establish-
ments. Young concerned Detroit's anti-skid row ordinance,"8 which
prohibited an "adult" establishment19 from locating within 1000 feet of
any two other regulated uses,"0 or within 500 feet of a residential
area.21 After the city denied two adult theater owners certificates to
operate because their businesses violated these distance requirements, 2
the owners challenged the ordinance on first amendment grounds.2 3
In a plurality opinion, 4 the Supreme Court upheld the ordinance.25
Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens created a limited exception to
16. Id. at 214-15.
17. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). For a more detailed analysis of Young, see generally Note,
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.: The War on Neighborhood Deterioration
Leaves First Amendment Casualty, 6 ENVTL. AFF. 101 (1977); Note, Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theaters, Inc.: Creating Levels of Protected Speech, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
321 (1977); Note, Zoning Adult Movie Theaters and the First Amendment: An Approach
to Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379 (1977); Comment,
Municipal Zoning Ordinance May Restrict Location of Adult Motion Picture Theatres,
16 WASHBURN L.J. 479 (1977); Comment, Young, American Mini Theaters, Inc.: A
Limit on First Amendment Protection, 12 NEw ENG. L. REV. 391 (1976).
18. 427 U.S. at 54. Cities enact "anti-skid row" ordinances to prevent the concen-
tration of establishments that have adverse affects on adjacent areas. Id. at 55. Specifi-
cally, these ordinances are designed to prevent the deterioration of neighborhoods. Id.
at 54 n.6 (citing DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCE 742-G § 66.000 (1972)).
19. The Detroit ordinance defined three types of adult establishments: adult book
stores, adult motion picture theaters having a capacity of 50 or more persons, and adult
mini-motion picture theaters having a capacity of less than 50 persons. 427 U.S. at 53
n.5.
20. "Regulated uses" include adult movie theaters, adult bookstores, cabarets, tav-
erns or bars, hotels or motels, pawnships, pool or billiard halls, public lodging houses,
second-hand stores, shoeshine parlors and taxi dance halls. Id. at 52 n.3.
21. Id. at 52.
22. Id. at 55. Both of the theaters were within 1000 feet of two other regulated uses,
and one was also within 500 feet of a residential area. Id.
23. Id. The owners sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconsti-
tutional and an injunction against the ordinance's enforcement. Id.
24. The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist
and Stevens. Id. at 52-73. Justice Powell concurred. Id. at 72-84. Justices Brennan,
Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun dissented. Id. at 84-96.
25. Id. at 73.
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the general rule that content based regulations are impermissible.26
His exception permits regulations restricting speech content, provided
such regulations do not depend on the government's approval or disap-
proval of the speech involved.27 Therefore, cities enacting regulations
that restrict protected speech must do so for reasons other than sup-
pressing that speech.28 Applying the exception, the plurality found no
evidence that the city otherwise disapproved of adult establishments; 29
the city adopted the ordinance in order to diminish urban blight.3"
The plurality warned, however, that had the ordinance served to sup-
press or greatly restrict access to lawful speech, it would be invalid."1
The dissent32 argued that time, place and manner33 regulations that
affect protected expressions must be content neutral.3 4
Read together, Young and Erznoznik appear in conflict. Erznoznik
requires complete content neutrality in an ordinance.35 Young, how-
ever, creates a limited exception that permits content regulation, pro-
vided the government does not approve or disapprove of the speech
involved.36 Because Young is a plurality opinion,37 and the members
26. Id. at 67-68.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 71-72 nn. 34-35.
30. Id. at 54 n.6.
31. Id. at 71 n.35. This footnote has received significant attention from many
courts. Subsequent interpretation of this footnote by lower courts seems to indicate that
if the effect, as opposed to intent, of the ordinance serves to suppress or greatly restrict
access to adult establishments, then the ordinance is unconstitutional. See infra notes
68-85 and accompanying text.
Justice Powell wrote separately to analyze the challenged ordinance under the test set
out in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). That test sustains regulation of
speech "If it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on . . . First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
Id. at 377. Justice Powell found all four prongs met in Young.
32. Justice Stewart based his dissent on content neutrality. 427 U.S. at 84-88. See
supra note 12. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissent based on the ordinance's vague-
ness. 427 U.S. at 88-94.
33. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209. The Court stated: "A State or municipality
may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regula-
tions applicable to all speech irrespective of content."
34. 427 U.S. at 84-85.
35. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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of the plurality either distinguished" or continued to accept
3 9
Erznoznik, Young's affect on Erznoznik is unclear. In addition, neither
the Young plurality nor concurrence explained Young's impact upon
Erznoznik's "content neutrality" rationale.'
The most recent Supreme Court case in the area of municipal regula-
tion of adult establishments is Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim."
In Schad a local zoning ordinance42 prohibited live entertainment, in-
cluding nude dancing, in any establishment within the borough.4 3 The
owner of an adult bookstore, who installed glass booths through which
customers could observe nude dancers challenged the ordinance.'
The Supreme Court, finding the ordinance unconstitutional, declared
that "when a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be
narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government
interest." 45 The ordinance failed to satisfy either requirement. First,
37. See supra note 24.
38. The plurality found the two ideas slightly different, because the secondary effect
of the ordinance in Young was the amelioration of neighborhood deterioration and
crime, while Erznoznik's secondary effect was the suppression of protected speech. 427
U.S. at 71 n.34. The concurrence distinguished the two cases by noting that Young
involved a zoning ordinance, while Erznoznik dealt with an ordinance attempting to
eliminate a public nuisance. Id. at 83.
39. The dissent felt Erznoznik's requirement of content neutrality should directly
control the Young decision. Id. at 87-88.
40. In People v. Valley Cinemas, Inc., 194 Cal. Rpt. 859 (Ct. App. 1983), the Cali-
fornia Appellate Court found that Erznoznik directly controlled the outcome. Id. at
862. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. Valley Cinemas demonstrates that
at least some courts still recognize Erznoznik's primary authority in spite of the Young
decision.
41. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). For a more detailed analysis of Schad, see generally Note,
Municipalities May Not Exclude Live Entertainment From Areas Zoned for Commercial
Uses: Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 86 DICK. L. REV. 91 (1982); Note, Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim: A Pyrrhic Victoryfor Freedom of Expression?, 15 LOY.
L.A.L. REV. 321 (1982); Note, The Police Power: An Effective Means of Limiting First
Amendment Guarantees?, 2 Miss C.L. REV. 361 (1982); Note, Second Class Speech:
The Court's Refinement of Content Regulation, 61 NEB. L. REV. 361 (1982); Note, Zon-
ing Prohibition Which Impinges Upon First Amendment Activity Must be Adequately
Justified by Municipality, 21 SETON HALL 311 (1982).
42. MOUNT EPHRAIM, N.J., ORDINANCE § 99-15B (1975). This ordinance pro-
vided a list of specific uses for land located in the borough. Id. It further provided that
[a]Ill uses not expressly permitted in this chapter are prohibited." Id. at § 99-4.
43. 452 U.S. at 65. Nude dancing, in some forms, is entitled to first amendment
protection. Id. at 66.
44. Id. at 64. The owner made his challenge after the city imposed fines on him for
violating the ordinance. Id.
45. Id. at 68.
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the ordinance was too broad. In addition to prohibiting nude dancing,
the ordinance banned dancing in musical and dramatic works,46 as well
as all other forms of live entertainment.47 Second, the city's rationale
for enacting the ordinance did not constitute a substantial government
interest.48 The borough contended that live entertainment would take
up commercial space necessary to meet the immediate needs of their
residents.49 The Court rejected this argument, finding that virtually
every item of service was available to Mt. Ephraim residents except live
entertainment.50  The borough also claimed that a ban on live en-
tertainment would help solve problems such as parking, trash, police
protection and medical care.5 ' The borough did not, however, present
any evidence that live entertainment presented more significant
problems of this nature than other business enterprises.52
Although Young upheld a zoning ordinance and Schad struck one
down, the two cases do not conflict. The Schad Court invalidated a
statute totally banning a protected first amendment right,53 while
Young merely upheld an ordinance restricting the areas where adult
establishments may locate to exercise a first amendment freedom.5 4
The two cases, however, identified different factors for courts to use
when evaluating an ordinance's constitutionality. Young stressed that
the reason for the ordinance must not be to suppress protected
speech,55 and that the ordinance may not severely restrict access to
protected speech.56 Schad established that an ordinance may not be so
overly broad as to prohibit protected speech,57 and must further a sub-
46. Id. at 65. Although the Court did not determine that nude dancing, such as
that prohibited by Mount Ephraim's ordinance, was entitled to constitutional protec-
tion, the Court held that other prohibited activities, such as dancing in musical and
dramatic works were protected by the first amendment. Id. at 65-66.
47. The ordinance did not prohibit noncommercial live entertainment. Id. at 66
n.5. Therefore, a high school could enact a play if it did not charge admission nor
perform in a commercial theater. Id.
48. Id. at 72.
49. Id. at 72-73.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 73-74.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 65-66.
54. 427 U.S. at 52. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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stantial government interest. 58
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Although the Young plurality permits limited regulation of adult es-
tablishments,59 lower courts have not readily approved such regula-
tions-even if' an ordinance is similar to the Young ordinance.
61
Courts generally look beyond the wording of the ordinance and ex-
amine the various factors set forth in Young,62 Schad 63 and
Erznoznik.6 The factors upon which courts concentrate are the effects
of,65 and purposes behind,66 the ordinance.
A. The Primary Factors Examined
1. Restricting Access to Protected Speech
Ordinances that severely restrict the number of adult establishments
in a municipality may pose constitutional problems. In Alexander v.
City of Minneapolis 61 the Eighth Circuit declared unconstitutional 6s an
ordinance69 similar to the ordinance in Young.7° The effect of the Al-
exander ordinance was a reduction in the number of adult establish-
58. See supra notes 45, 48 and accompanying text.
59. The usual presumption of constitutionality for most land use regulations is inap-
plicable when the case involves exclusionary zoning. Mandelker, The Free Speech
Revolution In Land Use Control, 60 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 51, 51-52 (1982).
60. See, e.g., infra notes 67-144 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
67. 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983).
68. 698 F.2d at 939.
69. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 540.410 (1977). This ordinance established two
restrictions. It stated that an adults-only facility may not operate within 500 feet of a
residentially zoned district, an office-residence district, a church, or day care or educa-
tional facilities. Id. at § 540.410(c). Second, the facility may not operate within 500 feet
of another adults-only facility. Id. at § 540.410(d).
70. 698 F.2d at 937 n.4. Although similar to Young, the Minneapolis ordinance had
a different purpose. The Detroit City Council designed the Young ordinance to stop the
rapid deterioration of neighborhoods. 427 U.S. at 50. Minneapolis created the Alexan-
der ordinance to prevent neighborhood deterioration from ever beginning. 698 F.2 at
937.
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ments in Minneapolis from over thirty to a maximum of twelve,
prohibiting new businesses to open. 7 1 Given these facts, the court
found that the ordinance clearly could not satisfy either the plurality
72
or concurrence 73 in Young,74 due to the significant restriction on access
to constitutionally protected speech.75
The Sixth Circuit made a similar finding in CLR Corp. v. Henline.
76
In Henline a Wyoming, Michigan, zoning ordinance77 limited adult
establishments to a 2500 foot road frontage that could only accommo-
date two to four establishments. 78 The court distinguished Young, be-
cause the Young ordinance provided a "myriad of locations" at which
adult establishments could permissibly locate. 79 In contrast, the Hen-
line court found that the Wyoming ordinance severely restricted access
to adult entertainment establishments.8 °
71. Id. at 938.
72. Id. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
73. 698 F.2d at 939. See supra note 31. Due to the severe restriction of access to
adult establishments, the Minneapolis ordinance could not satisfy the fourth prong of
the O'Brien test relied on by Justice Powell's concurrence. 427 U.S. at 79-80. The
fourth prong provides that a restriction on first amendment rights is not valid unless
"the incidental restriction on ... First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essen-
tial to furtherance of that interest." Id. at 80 (Powell, concurring) (citing United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
74. The dissent in Young clearly would have found the Minneapolis ordinance inva-
lid because it, like the ordinance in Young, was not content neutral. See supra notes 32-
34 and accompanying text.
75. 698 F.2d at 938.
76. 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1983).
77. WYOMING, MICH., CITY CODE § 60.75. This ordinance provides that adult es-
tablishments must locate in designated areas; must be 500 feet from any church, school
or residence; and be 1000 feet from any other restricted use. Id.
78. 702 F.2d at 639.
79. Id.
80. Id. For examples of other cases finding ordinances unconstitutional because of
severe restrictions on locations available for adult establishments, see Basiardanes v.
Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (ordinance totally banned adult establish-
ments in much of the city, and severely restricted permissible locations in remainder);
Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981) (effect of
ordinance was no lawful locations for adult establishments); E. & B. Enter. v. City of
University Park, 449 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (effect of ordinance provided only
two lawful locations for an adult establishment, one owned by the city and the other
already commercial occupied); cf. City of Minot v. Central Ave. News, Inc., 308
N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1981) (ordinance stating that "land which is equivalent in area to a
combination of many city blocks" for locating adult establishments does not severely
restrict access).
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Ordinances may invalidly restrict access not only by limiting the per-
missible number of adult establishments, but also by confining adult
establishments to undesirable locations. In North Street Book Shop v.
Village of Endicott,8 1 a local ordinance82 created only two areas within
the village where adult establishments lawfully could operate.83 One
area contained no available buildings, and the only available building
in the second area required extensive remodeling.84 A federal district
court in New York found that, due to the commercial undesirability of
the available locations, the ordinance restricted access to sexually ori-
ented material and significantly burdened the freedom of expression of
owners of adult establishments.8 5
2. Demonstrating a Substantial Government Interest
An ordinance regulating adult establishments must be narrowly
drawn to further a substantial government interest.86 In Endicott,
8 7
the district court felt that the government failed to assert a substantial
interest." Endicott enacted its ordinance 89 because, it contended,
adult establishments cause deterioration of neighborhoods where they
locate.9" Although this interest was identical to the interest asserted in
Young,9 1 the court found it unsubstantiated.9 2 Relying on Schad,93 the
81. 582 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
82. ENDICOTT VILLAGE, N.Y., CODE §§ 20-220 to 20-224 (1982). This ordinance
prohibited any adult entertainment business from locating within 500 feet of any resi-
dence, or within 1000 feet of another adult entertainment business, church, school,
park, playground or amusement arcade. Id. at § 20-221 B.
83. 582 F. Supp. at 1431.
84. Id. at 1431-32.
85. Id. at 1432. Other courts have also invalidated ordinances because of restric-
tions requiring adult establishments to operate only in undesirable areas. See Ba-
siardanes v. Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (available locations for adult
establishments were only in industrial zones far from other consumer oriented establish-
ments); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (adult estab-
lishments confined to undesirable industrial areas).
86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
87 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
88. 582 F. Supp. at 1436.
89. See supra note 82.
90 582 F. Supp. at 1433.
91. See supra notes 18-19 and acompanying text.
92 582 F. Supp. at 1433-35.
93. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
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court found that it is insufficient merely to state an interest.94 Endicott
must support its interest by showing a reasonable and significant need
for the zoning regulation." In Young, the City of Detroit presented
evidence of a relationship between concentrated areas of adult estab-
lishments and neighborhood deterioration.9 6 The Village of Endicott,
on the other hand, merely expressed an interest in preventing deterio-
ration without supplying any supporting evidence.97 As a result, the
ordinance could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.98
A Michigan district court followed a different approach in 15192
Thirteen Mile Road v. City of Warren.99 Although the City of Warren
94. 582 F. Supp. at 1434. Schad had noted that an important factor in Young was
that the Detroit Common Council studied the effects of concentrating adult establish-
ments in limited areas. 452 U.S. at 71-72. The study demonstrated that Detroit had
reason to believe that regulating the locations of adult establishments would help pre-
vent city blight. Id. But cf 15192 Thirteen Mile Rd. v. Warren, 593 F. Supp. 147 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (city council's reliance on the Detroit experience is sufficient factual justifi-
cation); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980) (city need not demon-
strate a past history of congregated adult uses causing neighborhood deterioration in
order to rely on such experience to justify legislative action).
95. 582 F. Supp. at 1434.
96. Young, 427 U.S. at 71.
97. 582 F. Supp. at 1434.
98. Id. at 1435. For examples of other cases holding that a locality must demon-
strate a substantial government interest in order for courts to uphold the constitutional-
ity of an adult use regulation, see Lydo Enters., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211
(9th Cir. 1984) (without a showing of available relocation sites, the court cannot deter-
mine whether the city's true purpose in passing the ordinance was to further the govern-
ment interests they expressed); CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1983)
(city failed to make factual findings that the ordinance would prevent urban blight, nor
could the city demonstrate a rational relationship between the asserted purpose and
effect of the ordinance); Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1983) (court
granted preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement of ordinance because the city
could point to no specific harm from the existence of adult entertainment establish-
ments); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982) (legislature
needed to demonstrate how concentration of adult enterprise has a different impact on
traffic and littering than other businesses); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667
F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981) (city needed to show empirical evidence that a single theater
within 100 yards of a specific area will have deleterious effects on the surrounding
neighborhood); Amico v. New Castle County, 571 F. Supp. 160 (D. Del. 1983) (city
failed to establish a rational relationship between its implementation of an adult use
ordinance and the goals of preserving neighborhoods and protecting children); Borrage
v. City of Louisville, 456 F. Supp. 30 (W.D. Ken. 1978) (city's empirical evidence that
adult establishments near family oriented facilities causes detrimental effects adequately
supports a substantial government interest).
99. 593 F. Supp. 147 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
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passed an ordinance"° ° that regulated the location of adult bookstores,
it had made no studies that demonstrated the benefit of dispersing
adult establishments, nor did it include a statement of purpose in the
ordinance's text.' 0 ' The court, however, upheld the ordinance; it con-
sidered two facts significant. First, no evidence existed which indicated
that "the Warren City Council enacted the ordinance in response to
the proposed opening of an adult entertainment facility." 10 2 Second,
the City Council had held the ordinance under advisement until the
Supreme Court decided Young. 10 3 The district court felt it unneces-
sary for cities to conduct their own research; they could rely upon the
"experience and findings of other legislative bodies" to justify a sub-
stantial government interest.
I°4
B. Methods Used by Municipalities To Subvent
the Primary Factors
Before an individual may operate an adult establishment, he must
not only meet location requirements, such as those set forth in
Young, 1°5 but often he must receive administrative board"0 6 approval
of the facility's intended use. 107 In Warren,"°8 an ordinance's special
100. WARREN, MICH., ZONING ORD. 14.02. This ordinance prohibited adult estab-
lishments within 500 feet of a residential area, or within 100 feet of another adult estab-
lishment, school or church. See 593 F. Supp. at 147. A city land use provision also
required that an owner obtain special use approval from both the City Planning Com-
mission and the Board of Zoning Appeals. Id. These agencies would approve a use
only if it did not harm the zoning district and nearby areas, and was not contrary to
"the spirit and purpose of the ordinances." 593 F. Supp. at 147 (quoting WARREN,
MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE 14.02.
101. 593 F. Supp. at 151.
102. Id. at 155. The court, however, apparently ignored the fact that a city council-
man had suggested that the City Attorney's Office "research the possibility of a regula-
tory scheme to keep various types of 'adult' activities out of Warren." Id. at 151.
103. Id. at 155.
104. Id. The district court upheld the distance requirements of the ordinance, but
found the special land use provision of the ordinance unconstitutional. Id. at 156. See
infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. See also Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d
1203, 1211 (7th Cir. 1980) (a city need not demonstrate that congregated adult uses
have actually caused neighborhood deterioration, and may rely on the experiences of
other cities to justify its actions).
105. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
106. "Administrative board" refers to city planning commissions, local zoning
boards, city councils and other authorities with similar duties.
107. In 15192 Mile Rd., the City Planning Commission and Board of Zoning Ap-
peals had to approve the bookstore's location. See also Entertainment Concepts, Inc.
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use provision10 9 authorized the City Planning Commission to deny an
adult establishment owner a permit to operate. Despite an owner's
compliance with the ordinance's location requirements, the Commis-
sion could withhold a permit if it determined that the business would
have a "deleterious effect on the surrounding area." ' Given this in-
definite language and lack of guidelines, the court feared that the city
could prohibit any adult establishment from locating in the commu-
nity. 11  As a result, the court declared the special land use provision of
the city ordinance unconstitutional.' 1 2
Another method municipalities use to regulate adult establishments
is to pass ordinances controlling the type of activity permissible on a
business premise. In County of King ex rel. Sowers v. Chisman,"3 a
county ordinance' 14 prohibited nude dancing in public establishments
except on a stage at least six feet from the nearest patron. 115 The
owner of a topless dancing establishment challenged" 6 the ordinance's
constitutionality." 7 The Washington State Appellate Court upheld
the ordinance because it did not prohibit nude dancing,' 18 but merely
III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980) (ordinance requiring prior authoriza-
tion by city before issuance of business license for adult theaters although not requiring
prior authorization for regular movie theaters, is impermissible prior restraint on pro-
tected speech); East Side News, Inc. v. City of Geneva, 538 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ohio
1981) (refusal of city council to issue business permit to adult bookstore strictly because
of content of merchandise to be sold is unconstitutional).
108. 593 F. Supp. 147.
109. See supra note 100 (explaining the ordinance).
110. 593 F. Supp. at 151.
111. Id. at 156.
112. Id. See also Wendling v. City of Duluth, 495 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Minn. 1980)
(ordinance giving government officials unfettered discretion to decide whether to issue
adult bookstore a license is unconstitutional); San Juan Liquors v. Consolidated City of
Jacksonville, 480 F. Supp. 151 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (governments may not enforce an over-
broad statute in a discriminatory manner).
113. 33 Wash. App. 809, 658 P.2d 1256 (1983).
114. KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE 6.08.
115. Id. at 6.08.027(A)(6).
116. The county obtained a preliminary injunction ordering the owner to stop all
topless dancing in his establishment. 33 Wash. App. at 810, 658 P.2d at 1257. The
owner later challenged the statute after a court found him in contempt for violating the
preliminary injunction. Id.
117. Id. at 811, 658 P.2d at 1258.
118. By finding the ordinance a valid time, place and manner regulation, the court
avoided the issue of whether the particular type of nude dancing involved in this case
deserved constitutional protection. Id. at 814, 658 P.2d at 1259.
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imposed a reasonable time, place and manner"' restriction. 12  The
court distinguished Schad in which the ordinance prohibited all danc-
ing, nude or not, and therefore, clearly infringed on constitutionally
protected activities. 12
1
Governments often insulate ordinances from constitutional scrutiny
by arguing that the ordinances merely impose reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions. People v. Valley Cinemas, Inc. 122 concerned
an ordinance 123 that prohibited exhibition of films containing specified
sex acts when the films could be viewed beyond the property line by
children, neighbors or passing motorists. 124 San Joaquin County ad-
mitted that the ordinance infringed on constitutionally protected activ-
ity, 125 but argued that it was a valid reasonable time, place and manner
restriction. 126 Because the ordinance lacked content neutrality, 127 the
court found the ordinance in direct conflict with Erznoznik,'28 and
therefore unconstitutional.
129
American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut, 13 0 dealt with a
unique attempt to regulate adult establishments. In Hudnut, the Indi-
anapolis City Council passed an ordinance that made trafficking' 3 ' in
pornography 32 an unlawful discriminatory practice. 133 As a result of
the ordinance, production, distribution or sale of pornographic mate-
119. See id.; supra note 33 and accompanying text.
120, 33 Wash. App. at 814, 650 P.2d at 1259.
121. Id.
122. 194 Cal. Rptr. 859 (Ct. App. 1983).
123. SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE 2917 (1982). For a full description
of the ordinance, see 194 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.2.
124. 194 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
125. Id. at 862.
126. Id. at 861.
127. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
129. 194 Cal. Rptr. at 862. The Valley Cinemas court indicated that Young may
have altered Erznoznik, but never clearly explained the change. Id. at 863-64.
130. 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
131. The ordinance defined "trafficking" as the "production, sale, exhibition, or dis-
tribution of pornography." Id. at 1320 (citing INDIANAPOLIS CITY, IND., ORDINANCE
§ 16-15(4) (1984)).
132. The ordinance contained an extensive definition of "pornography". 598 F.
Supp. 1320 (citing INDIANAPOLIS CITY, IND., ORDINANCE § 16-3(q) (1984)).
133. 598 F. Supp. at 1320. The ordinance declared that pornography was a "dis-
criminatory practice based on sex which denies women equal opportunity in society."
Id. (quoting INDIANAPOLIS CITY, IND., ORDINANCE § 16-1(a)(2) (1984).
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rial was nearly impossible.134 An array of plaintiffs, 135 representing
both the book 136 and film 137 industries, filed suit, contending that the
ordinance was unconstitutional. 138  The city admitted the ordinance
went beyond regulating obscenity. 139 They argued, however, that por-
nography is a form of sex-based discrimination. 40 Such discrimina-
tion creates a compelling state interest warranting regulation. 141 The
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana rejected the city's
argument.142 Refusing to deviate from existing constitutional law,' 43
the court held that the ordinance violated the first amendment because
it regulated more than obscenity.' 44
IV. CONCLUSION
Young demonstrated a relaxation of first amendment rights in favor
of local zoning regulations.1 45 Young, however, did not initiate a judi-
cial trend permitting excessive restrictions on adult entertainment es-
tablishments. Instead, courts are strictly applying the limiting factors
set out in Young, Schad and Erznoznik. For example, Alexander and
Henline found adult use ordinances unconstitutional because they se-
verely limited the number of possible adult establishments. 46 Endicott
134. Id. at 1327.
135. See infra notes 136-37. In addition to the book and film plaintiffs, one individ-
ual joined the lawsuit as a plaintiff in order to protect his right as "a reader and viewer
of First Amendment protected material." 598 F. Supp. at 1319.
136. Book industry plaintiffs included booksellers, publishers, book distributors and
the Freedom to Read Foundation. 598 F. Supp. at 1319.
137. Film industry plaintiffs included a satellite television transmission company
and a store that rents video cassettes. Id.
138. Id. at 1327. The plaintiffs specifically sought "to preliminarily and perma-
nently enjoin enforcement of, and to declare facially unconstitutional, void and of no
effect," the ordinances involved in this litigation. Id.
139. Id. at 1332. The City of Indianapolis argued that the obscenity test in Miller v.
United States, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), see supra note 7, did not create a bright line between
protected and unprotected expression. 598 F. Supp. at 1332. The ordinance was not
per se unconstitutional, the city argued, simply because it regulated more than obscen-
ity, as defined by Miller. Id.
140. 598 F. Supp. at 1333-35.
141. Id. at 1335-37.
142. Id. at 1337.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
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went even further, holding that restriction of adult establishments to
commercially undesirable locations unconstitutionally restricted access
to adult entertainment.'4 7 In addition, courts require localities to
demonstrate a substantial interest in support of adult use ordinances.
Although some courts, such as Endicott, are more stringent14 8 in deter-
mining what constitutes sufficient support, a municipality must indi-
cate some purpose behind the ordinance other than to suppress
protected speech. Courts also are recognizing the potential abuse of
"special land use provisions" included in some adult use ordinances.14 9
Finally, cases such as Chisman recognizes that restrictions on adult
establishments must be reasonable,15 ° and Valley Cinemas acknowl-
edges the "content-neutral" rationale set forth in Erznoznik.15' As this
summary indicates, instead of using Young to place zoning laws above
first amendment protections, courts are adhering strictly to require-
ments that protect first amendment rights.
ADDENDUM
As this article went to press, the Supreme Court decided City of Ren-
ton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. '5 2 The City of Renton, Washington, en-
acted a zoning ordinance that prohibited "adult motion picture
theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single-
or multi-family dwelling, church, park, or school." 153 The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals declared the ordinance unconstitutional. 5 4 In a
6-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, relying
primarily on Young.
The Court first held that the ordinance in question was a "content-
neutral" time, place and manner regulation.15 5 The ordinance was
designed to protect the quality of life in the community, not to suppress
147. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
148. The Court in Endicott, for example, appeared to require that governments
demonstrate a higher degree of support for a substantial governmental interest than did
the Warren court. See also supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text (discussion of a
'substantial government interest").
149. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
152. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
153. Id. at 927.
154. 748 F.2d 527 (1984).
155. 106 S. Ct. at 928.
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unpopular views.156 Therefore, the ordinance was "aimed not at the
content of the films shown at 'adult motion picture theatres,' but rather
at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding commu-
nity.",157 Next, the Court considered whether the ordinance was cre-
ated to serve a substantial governmental interest. Relying on Young,
the Court held that preventing neighborhood deterioration was a sub-
stantial interest. 158
A number of questions that Young did not answer were addressed by
the Court. First, the Court held that a city may enact such an ordi-
nance based on the experiences of other cities, "so long as whatever
evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the
problem the city addresses."' 159
Next, the Court held constitutional those ordinances that disperse
adult entertainment establishments, as in Young, and ordinances that
concentrate them, as in Renton.'60 Because the Renton ordinance only
affected those establishments "shown to produce the unwanted secon-
dary effects," the Court held Renton avoided the "overinclusiveness"
problems encountered in Schad and Erznoznik. 6' Similarly, although
the Renton ordinance only regulated adult "theaters," the Court found
the ordinance was not underinclusive. Because the City of Renton did
not have any other adult businesses, the Court refused to assume the
city would not regulate any similar establishments should the need
arise. 162
Finally, the Court addressed the problem of whether the ordinance
left "reasonable alternative avenues of communication." The ordi-
nance set aside 520 acres for adult theaters, but the potential theater
owners claimed there were no "commercially viable" sites available.' 63
The Court rejected this claim, finding that "the First Amendment re-
quires only that Renton refrain from effectively denying adult theater
owners a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater
within the city." 1 "6 The Court held that the first amendment is not
156. Id. 929.
157. Id. (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 930.
159. Id. at 931.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. No other adult establishments were planned.
163. Id. at 932.
164. Id.
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violated simply because someone else owns better commercial real es-
tate and it is economically unfeasible to develop the statutorily allotted
land. 165
The dissent 166 believed the Renton ordinance was not "content neu-
tral," 167 did not protect a substantial governmental interest, 168 and did
not provide for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication." 169
The Renton decision clarifies the standards a municipality must sat-
isfy in order to regulate adult business. It enables a municipality to
now make limited areas available for adult theaters and their patrons,
and at the same time preserves the quality of life in the community by
preventing such establishments from randomly locating in any area.
Accordingly, it is clear that the Renton decision, in contradiction of
many of the lower court decisions discussed in the main body of this
article, effectuates a balance that is "the essence of zoning." 17
0
Edmund J. Postawko*
165. Id.
166. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Marshall.
167. Id. at 934-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 937 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 937-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 932.
* J.D. Washington University School of Law, 1985.
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